We empirically analyze the welfare effects of cross-firm bundling in the pharmaceutical industry. Physicians often treat patients with "cocktail" regimens that combine two or more drugs. Firms cannot price discriminate because each drug is produced by a different firm and a physician creates the bundle in her office from the component drugs. We show that a less competitive equilibrium arises with cocktail products because firms can internalize partially the externality their pricing decisions impose on competitors. The incremental profits from creating a bundle are sometimes as large as the incremental profits from a merger of the same two firms.
Introduction
In the pharmaceutical market patients often take a combination of two or more drugs in order to improve the e¢ cacy of treating a disease or alleviate side e¤ects. Most HIV/AIDS patients, for example, receive a "cocktail" regimen, such as efavirenz, lamivudine, and zidovudine. Three of the six new cholesterol-reducing drugs entering phase 3 clinical trials in 2007 were combinations of drugs that had already been approved as stand-alone products to treat the disease (Blume- In this paper we analyze empirically the welfare e¤ects of cross-…rm bundling for pharmaceutical treatment of cancer patients where each cocktail consists of drugs made by di¤erent …rms, and each drug is also o¤ered as a stand-alone product. In this market a …rm is constrained to set the same price (i.e., a price per milligram of active ingredient) for both its stand-alone product as well as its component of a cocktail product. This pricing constraint exists because oncologists purchase the component drugs from di¤erent manufacturers and then infuse the regimen into a patient in an o¢ ce or hospital clinic. 1 This is an example of mixed bundling in an oligopoly market, where there is demand for a bundle of products due to their complementarity but …rms cannot price discriminate.
Firms often bundle or tie their own products for various reasons, and there is a substantial economic literature analyzing this practice. Bundling may allow a …rm to engage in price discrimination (McAfee and Whinston, 1989) , to leverage monopoly power in one market by foreclosing sales and discouraging entry in another market (Whinston, 1990; Chen, 1997; Carlton and Waldman, 2002; Nalebu¤, 2004) , or alter a pricing game among oligopolists even when entry is not deterred or no …rms exit (Carlton, Gans, and Waldman, 2007) . However, little is known about price changes when a …rm's product is bundled with those of its rival, and welfare e¤ects of this practice.
Firms entering the oncology market often test their experimental drug in combination with a drug that is already approved. The entering …rm can purchase the approved product without the permission of the incumbent …rm, and administer the two drugs together in a clinical trial. 2 The fact that an entering …rm bears the cost of clinical trials indicates that it expects positive pro…t. The cocktail's impact on incumbents, however, is not clear a priori. Patients may prefer having cocktail regimens because they provide more options for treatment, but if prices increase substantially as a result, patients may be worse o¤ with cocktails. Cocktail regimens allow …rms to internalize partially the externalities their pricing strategies impose on competitors. Cocktails also steal market share from existing regimens. If the former e¤ect is larger than the latter, cocktails render the market less competitive; if the latter e¤ect is larger, cocktails increase competition.
We focus on the market for colorectal cancer chemotherapy drugs. We …rst estimate a demand system at the regimen level using data on regimen prices, market shares, and attributes. 3 Regimens, which can be a single drug or a cocktail of two or more drugs, are well de…ned and standardized. Organizations such as the National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) recommend the amount of each drug that oncologists should use in each regimen, based on the dosages used in clinical trials or in actual practice. A regimen price is a function of the price and quantity (or dose) of each component drug used in the regimen. A cocktail regimen's price is thus a¤ected by prices of all drugs used in the regimen, and a …rm whose drug is used in a cocktail regimen must set a single drug price to maximize pro…t across its stand-alone and cocktail products.
Market share is de…ned as the proportion of chemotherapy patients treated with a particular regimen. Data from randomized clinical trials provide information on attributes such as regimen e¢ cacy (e.g., median number of months patients survived in the clinical trial) and side e¤ects (e.g., the percent of patients in the clinical trial who experienced abdominal pain).
The demand estimates and a pro…t maximization condition allow us to recover the marginal cost of each drug. We analyze the economic e¤ects of cocktails by performing a series of counter- 2 Rather than modeling a …rm's decision regarding whether and how to combine its product with other …rms' products, we take existing product combinations as given. Scott Morton (1999) is the only paper we are aware of that models explicitly a pharmaceutical …rm's decison of whether to enter a market, and she focuses on the subsequent entry of generic …rms rather than the initial decision by the innovating …rm. She …nds that generic pharmaceutical …rms tend to enter markets that have supply and demand characteristics similar to the …rm's portfolio of products. 3 Our empirical approach allows us to study bundled pricing in an unrestrictive way. The existing bundling literature assumes either that the utility of consuming a bundle is the sum of utilities of each product (independent products) or that it is less than the sum (substitutes). Instead, we use data to measure directly the utility of each product.
factual exercises. First, we remove cocktail regimens one at a time and compute new equilibrium prices. One underlying assumption is that drug-level marginal costs and patients' preference regarding e¢ cacy and side e¤ects do not change when a regimen is removed; regimen-level own-and cross-price elasticities, however, do change. We …nd that pro…ts of all …rms involved in that cocktail decrease and consumer surplus increases when a cocktail is removed. Cocktail regimens increase pro…ts for an entrant as well as the incumbent, but harm consumers. This occurs because cocktail regimens result in high drug prices; the e¤ect of internalizing pricing externalities dominates the business stealing e¤ect in our application.
In the second counterfactual we compare the market with cocktails to markets with hypothetical mergers between …rms that contribute to a cocktail. This allows us to assess how collusive the market has become with cocktail regimens. We consider two merger scenarios. In the …rst scenario we remove one cocktail regimen and allow the two participating …rms to merge instead.
We …nd that …rms can earn higher pro…ts from having a cocktail regimen than from the merger.
In the second merger scenario we allow a pair of …rms to merge while maintaining their cocktail regimen. The merging …rm has an incentive to increase prices to exploit its market power, but at the same time it also has an incentive to lower prices to exploit a cocktail regimen's complementarity. We …nd that some hypothetical mergers result in higher prices and others in lower prices, but the merger never increases pro…ts substantially. Speci…cally, a …rm's pro…t never increases by more than 12 percent and in one case the merging …rm's pro…t actually falls. These results indicate that cocktails facilitate almost as much collusion as mergers.
In the third counterfactual we allow a …rm to set two separate drug prices, one for its stand-alone regimen and the other for its component drug in a cocktail regimen. This is equivalent to a case where a …rm has two separate drugs, one used by itself and the other in a cocktail regimen. Setting two prices introduces a new strategic incentive that we observe in other sectors of the pharmaceutical market. In the early 2000s Abbott launched Kaletra, a drug for treating HIV/AIDS. At the time Abbott was already selling Norvir, which was used in a cocktail regimen to help boost the performance of its competitor's drug. Shortly after the launch of Kaletra, Abbott increased Norvir's price four-fold while pricing Kaletra more competitively, presumably to drive customers from the cocktail regimen to its new stand-alone regimen. Although we do not observe a similar situation in the colorectal drug market, we use this exercise as an "out-of-sample" validation test for our static Nash pricing assumption. We …nd similar pricing behaviors in our counterfactual: …rms set the price of the cocktail component higher than the stand-alone drug when allowed this ‡exibility.
In addition to the bundling literature, this paper is also related to the literature on the In Section 2 we present an overview of colorectal cancer treatment and we describe the data in Section 3. We present the model in Section 4 and simple numerical examples in Section 5 where two …rms each have a single stand-alone regimen and each contribute their drug to a third cocktail regimen. Results from the demand estimation and counterfactual exercises are presented in Section 6 and Section 7, respectively. We conclude in Section 8.
Overview of Colorectal Cancer
Colorectal cancer is the fourth most common cancer based on the number of newly-diagnosed patients, after breast, prostate, and lung cancers. About one in 20 people born today is expected to be diagnosed with colorectal cancer over their lifetime. The disease is treatable if it is detected before it metastasizes, or spreads, to other areas of the body. Between 1999 and 2006, colorectal cancer patients had a 65 percent chance of surviving for …ve years and a 58 percent chance of surviving for 10 years (National Cancer Institute). The probability a patient will survive for …ve years ranges from 90 percent for those diagnosed with Stage I cancer to 12 percent for those diagnosed with Stage IV (or metastatic) cancer. 4 The way a colorectal cancer patient is treated depends on the stage of the tumor at diagnosis. Most patients with a Stage I, II, or III tumor will have the tumor removed surgically (i.e., resected). The NCCN recommends that patients with Stage III disease receive six months of chemotherapy following the resection; they do not recommend chemotherapy for Stage I patients; and they encourage Stage II patients to discuss the bene…ts and costs of with their oncologist before deciding. The majority of patients diagnosed with Stage IV disease have an unresectable tumor.
Some of these patients receive chemotherapy to shrink the tumor such that it can be resected, and many receive chemotherapy without prior surgical treatment. Our demand model examines patients' chemotherapy treatments choices once they have decided to receive chemotherapy; we assume patients have already decided whether or not to receive surgery prior to chemotherapy treatment.
Five major pharmaceutical …rms produced a patent-protected (or branded) colorectal cancer drug during our study period: P…zer (which produced irinotecan), Roche (capecitabine), Sano… (oxaliplatin), ImClone (cetuximab), and Genentech (bevacizumab). There are 12 major treatment regimens, half of which are cocktail regimens, composed of two or more branded drugs, and half consist of a single branded drug. In one cocktail regimen, Roche's capecitabine is combined with P…zer's irinotecan. In another capecitabine is combined with Sano…'s oxaliplatin. Genentech's bevacizumab is combined separately with oxaliplatin, irinotecan, and oxaliplaitin and capecitabine to create three distinct cocktail regimens. Finally, ImClone's cetuximab is combined with P…zer's irinotecan. 5 Three of the remaining six regimens are individual drugs used in the cocktail regimens mentioned above, but in di¤erent dosages. The other non-cocktail regimen are ‡uourouracil combined with leucovorin (5FU/LV), both of which are generic drugs; P…zer's irinotecan combined with 5FU/LV; and Sano…'s oxaliplatin combined with 5FU/LV. We take the generic drug's price as given and assume they are priced at marginal cost, not the result of …rms'strategic pricing. We therefore treat the last two regimens described above as being stand-alone regimens. The appendix Because each drug is sold separately to physicians who then combine them (when relevant) into a cocktail regimen, the only variable a …rm controls is the price of its own drug. This price, in turn, a¤ects the demand and pro…ts of all cocktail regimens in which the drug appears. We explicitly account for this impact in our supply-side (pricing) model in Section 4.
Data
We use several data sources to collect four types of information: drug prices, regimen market shares, the quantity/dose of each drug typically used in a regimen, and regimen attributes from clinical trials (e.g., the median number of months patients survived when taking the regimen in a phase 3 clinical trial). IMS Health collects information on the sales in dollars and the quantity of drugs purchased by 10 di¤erent types of customers (e.g., hospitals, physician o¢ ces, retail pharmacies) from wholesalers in each quarter from 1993 through the third quarter of 2005. Prices and quantities are reported separately by National Drug Classi…cation (NDC) code, which are unique for each …rm-product-strength/dosage-package size. We calculate the average price paid per milligram of active ingredient of a drug across the di¤erent NDC codes for a particular drug. IMS Health reports the invoice price a customer actually pays to a wholesaler, not the average wholesale price (AWP) that is set by a manufacturer and often di¤ers substantially from the true transaction price.
The price we calculate does not include any discounts or rebates a customer may receive from a manufacturer after purchasing the product from the wholesaler. Based on interviews with oncologists and an analysis reported in Lucarelli, Nicholson, and Town (2010), we do not believe that manufacturers o¤ered substantial rebates during this period. 6 Although we have information on 10 di¤erent types of customers, we focus on the prices paid by the two largest customershospitals and physician o¢ ces -because most colon cancer chemotherapy drugs are infused in a physician's o¢ ce or hospital clinic. 7 We compute the price of each regimen for a representative patient who has a surface area of 1.7 meters squared (Jacobson and Newhouse, 2006), weighs 80 kilograms, and is treated for 12 weeks. Regimen prices are derived by multiplying the average price per milligram of active ingredient in a quarter by the recommended dosage of each drug in the regimen over a 12-week period. 8 The NCCN reports the typical amount of active ingredient used by physicians for the major regimens. 9 Dosage information is reported in the appendix. For example, the standard dosage schedule for oxaliplatin+5FU/LV, the regimen with the second largest market share in 2005, is 85 milligrams (mg) of oxaliplatin per meter squared of a patient's surface area infused on the …rst day of treatment, followed by a 1,000 mg infusion of ‡uourouracil (5FU) per meter squared of surface area on the …rst and second treatment days, and a 200 mg infusion of leucovorin (LV) per meter squared on the …rst and second treatment days. This process is repeated every two weeks. 6 For the …ve patent-protected colorectal cancer drugs in our study, Lucarelli, Nicholson, and Town (2010) compared prices that include discounts and rebates to the IMS prices that we use in this paper. They found that prices from the two data sources were within two to four percent of one another, which is consistent with no or small rebates/discounts. 7 Based on data from IMS Health, 59% of colorectal cancer drugs in the third quarter of 2005 were purchased by physician o¢ ces and 28% by hospitals. The remainder was purchased by retail and mail order pharmacies, health maintenance organizations, and long-term care facilities. 8 The regimens are priced using price data for the contemporaneous quarter only. 9 We supplement this where necessary with dosage information from drug package inserts, conference abstracts, and journal articles.
The IMS Health data contain information on market share by drug, but not market share for combinations of drugs (regimens). We rely, therefore, on two di¤erent sources for regimen-speci…c market shares, where market share is de…ned as the proportion of colorectal cancer chemotherapy patients treated with a particular regimen. IntrinsiQ collects monthly data from its oncology clients on the types of chemotherapy drugs administered to patients. Based on these data, we All regimens we include in the sample contain drugs that were approved by the FDA for colorectal cancer and had a market share greater than one percent at the end of the sample period.
The outside option includes o¤-label drugs, regimens with less than one percent market share at the end of the sample period, and regimens with missing attribute data. 12 We plot market shares for the 12 regimens in the sample and the outside option in Figure 1 .
Between 1993 and 1996, about 95 percent of colorectal cancer patients were treated with 5FU/LV, a generic regimen, with the remainder treated with o¤-label drugs or regimens with small market share. In 1996 irinotecan was approved by the FDA for treating colorectal cancer, and over the next several years the market share of irinotecan and irinotecan combined with 5FU/LV grew at the expense of 5FU/LV. 13 (oxaliplatin + 5FU/LV and bevacizumab + oxaliplatin + 5FU/LV) surpassed the market share of 5FU/LV, whose share had fallen to about 14 percent. 14 We obtain most of the attribute information from the FDA-approved package inserts that accompany each drug. These inserts describe the performance of the drug/regimen in phase 3 clinical trials, including the number and types of patients enrolled in the trials, the health outcomes for patients in the treatment and control groups, and the side e¤ects experienced by these patients.
Often there are multiple observations for a regimen, either because a manufacturer conducted separate trials of the same regimen, or because a regimen may have been used for the treatment group in one clinical trial and the control group in a subsequent trial. In these cases we calculate the mean attributes across the separate observations. Where necessary, we supplement the package insert information with abstracts presented at oncology conferences and journal articles.
We summarize the attribute information in Table 1 , taking a weighted (by market share) average across regimens in each quarter and then averaging across quarters for each year. The e¢ cacy and side e¤ect attributes are time invariant while price can change each quarter. We record three measures of a regimen's e¢ cacy: the median number of months patients survive after initiating therapy (Survival Months); the percentage of patients who experience a complete or partial reduction in the size of their tumor (Response Rate); and the mean number of months (across patients in the trial) before the cancer advanced to a more serious state (Time to Progression).
We also record the percentage of patients in phase 3 trials who experienced either a grade 3 or a grade 4 side e¤ect for …ve separate conditions: abdominal pain, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, and neutropenia. Although many more side e¤ects are recorded for most regimens, these …ve were consistently recorded across the 12 regimens in the sample. Side e¤ects are classi…ed on a 1 to 4 scale, with grade 4 being the most severe. Higher values for the side e¤ect attributes should be associated with worse health outcomes although regimens that are relatively toxic are likely to be both more e¤ective and have more severe side e¤ects.
This table demonstrates that there was a large price increase in 1998. The average regimen price for a 12-week treatment cycle increased from about $50 to over $300. This jump is due to the introduction of P…zer's irinotecan. Since then the average price continued to rise with signi…cant jumps in 2001 when Roche's capecitabine was introduced, and in 2004 when bevacizumab and cetuximab were launched. 15 New regimens tend to be more e¢ cacious than the existing regimens, with side e¤ect pro…les that are sometimes more and sometimes less severe than earlier regimens (Lucarelli and Nicholson, 2008 ).
Model 4.1 Supply
We assume that …rms play a static Nash-Bertrand game with di¤erentiated products. Because drugs in our data set are protected by patents, the …rms have considerable market power. However, physicians have multiple treatment alternatives, which puts the …rms in an oligopolistic competitive environment. The price hike by Abbott in the AIDS drug market mentioned earlier provides evidence that price is a crucial strategic variable in the pharmaceutical market. In the third counterfactual exercise we show that our static Nash pricing is consistent with the AIDS market Nevertheless, price setting may not fully describe pharmaceutical …rms'strategic behavior.
Marketing to physicians (i.e., detailing) is the most important non-price action. We do not observe detailing activity and do not attempt to include it in the model. We also do not explicitly model decisions by some pharmaceutical …rms to provide a rebate to certain physicians if their purchased volume exceeds a certain threshold for the quarter or year. We are not aware of any study that examines how physicians react to rebates, presumably because …rms do not disclose rebates. And as mentioned above, discounts/rebates in the colorectal chemotherapy market appear to be small. Although these features are not considered in the supply side model, we introduce a shock in the demand model to capture physicians'reaction to such supply-side decisions.
Let p f be the price …rm f charges for its drug/product. Consistent with our data, we assume that each …rm produces only one drug, and therefore, p f is the only endogenous variable in the …rm's optimization problem. We denote mc f as the marginal cost for …rm f , and q f (p) the quantity produced by …rm f . Pro…ts for …rm f are
where q f (p) is obtained by aggregating quantities across the regimens in which the …rm participates.
Formally, if …rm f participates in R f regimens, and r = 1; : : : ; R f , then q f (p) can be written as
where s r (p) is the share of patients treated with regimen r, q rf is the dosage of the drug produced by …rm f used in regimen r, and M is the market size. p R k ; the price of regimen k; is determined by p f and q rf : For example, if regimen 1 is …rm 1's stand-alone regimen,
is a cocktail regimen, comprised of drugs from …rm 1 and …rm 2, p R 3 = q 31 p 1 + q 32 p 2 :
The equilibrium conditions can then be written as
Equation (1) shows that a …rm will take into account the e¤ect of its drug price on the overall price of each regimen (@p R k =@p f ), and how changes in regimen prices impact the market shares of all regimens in which a drug participates (@s r (p)=@p R k ). The former e¤ect is determined by the quantity of a drug used in a recommended regimen "recipe;" the latter e¤ect is determined by the regimen's price elasticity of demand, which we estimate using regimen-level data. We can recover the marginal costs of each drug by re-writing equation (1) for these costs.
Equation (1) highlights that an analytical analysis is not straightforward. Consider the simplest case where …rm 1 and …rm 2 each sell a stand-alone regimen and there is one cocktail regimen that combines the two …rms'drugs. If all three regimens are substitutes for one another, the pro…t-maximizing …rst order condition for …rm 1 becomes
Note that while @p R k =@p f is …xed by the recommended recipe (which was chosen years earlier when structuring the clinical trial), @s r =@p R k is a function of price unless one assumes a constant elasticity demand. We rely, therefore, on numerical and empirical analyses to study the economic implications of cocktail regimens.
Demand
We obtain our demand system by aggregating over a discrete choice model of physician behavior.
Following the Lancasterian tradition, products are assumed to be bundles of attributes, and preferences are represented as the utility derived from those attributes. A physician may choose a highly e¤ective regimen if a patient can tolerate side e¤ects, or she may choose a less e¤ective regimen with more bearable side e¤ects. We also include price as an attribute. It is not obvious physicians pay attention to price because of health insurance. However, most Medicare patients pay about 20% of the treatment cost out of their pocket, most private insurance plans require patient cost sharing, and private plans often have a lifetime maximum coverage limit. We also allow physicians to observe regimen-speci…c attributes beyond those we observe in the clinical trials, i.e., attributes that physicians observe but we do not. Value distribution every time she makes a choice, which makes our model a so-called logit demand model. Thus, a physician choice is a probabilistic event, with regimen attributes determining the probability.
The indirect utility of physician i over regimens j 2 f0; : : : ; J t g at time (market) t is characterized as
where p jt is the price of regimen j at time t, x j are observable regimen attributes such as e¢ cacy and side e¤ects, t is the mean of unobserved attributes for each period, and jt is the regimen speci…c deviation from t . " ijt represents the idiosyncratic shock from Type I Extreme Value distribution following McFadden (1981) and Berry (1994).
We estimate t using quarterly indicator variables. jt , which represents demand shocks or regimen attributes that physicians observe but we do not, is likely to be correlated with price.
That is, price is endogenous as in most demand models. All terms other than " ijt represent patient utility (e.g., patient co-payments, observed and unobserved attributes of the treatment);
" ijt captures any unobserved elements that a¤ect a physician's choice independent of patient utility.
The outside option (j = 0) includes o¤-label colon cancer treatments, regimens with small market shares, or regimens without a complete set of attributes. The utility of the outside options is set to zero.
Market shares for each regimen j are de…ned as
This leads to the following demand equation
Berry (1994) provides details of this derivation.
In this model all the individual-speci…c heterogeneity is contained in the idiosyncratic shock to preferences and, therefore, it su¤ers from the well-known independence of irrelevant alternatives criticism. 16 Berry and Pakes (2007) propose an alternative demand model that removes the idiosyncratic shock from the indirect utility function and assign a random coe¢ cient to at least one product attribute. In our pharmaceutical context, this pure characteristics model implies that physicians are perfect agents for their patients and are not a¤ected by detailing or rebates. The pure characteristics model has a "local" substitution pattern, while the model with the idiosyncratic shock has a global pattern. 17 However, based on numerical simulations similar to those in Section 
where ln s j=g is a regimen's within-group market share.
Numerical Analysis
Before we apply models to the data, we examine cross-…rm bundling numerically in the simplest setting. In the benchmark case, …rm 1 and …rm 2 sell one stand-alone regimen each without cross- 1 6 Although we could alleviate this problem by allowing for random coe¢ cients on price and product attributes following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), we are unlikely to identify the random coe¢ cients with our existing data set. Usually one needs the consumer distribution from multiple markets as in Nevo (2000) , or micro choice data as in Petrin (2002) . We, on the other hand, observe the same market over time and lack micro choice data on physicians'decisions. 1 7 See Berry and Pakes (2007) and Song (2007) for a more detailed discussion of the di¤erences between these two models.
…rm bundling (i.e., no cocktail regimen). The …rms compete a la Bertrand and consumer demand is based on the utility function in equation (3) . Assuming a price coe¢ cient of -1 and given product quality, which we denote j for j = 1 and 2, the …rms set price to maximize static pro…ts. 19 In the empirical analysis we use actual market share data and observed regimen attributes to estimate product quality and …x its value, but in the numerical analysis we change quality to study how quality di¤erentiation a¤ects prices, pro…t, and consumer surplus.
We introduce a cocktail regimen by allowing the two …rms to combine their drugs, given 1 and 2 . We assume that this third regimen's product quality, say 3 , is the maximum of 1 and 2 .
The cocktail regimen can be produced using di¤erent combinations of the two drugs. Recall from Section 4 that q rf is the dosage of a drug produced by …rm f used in regimen r. For simplicity we set q 11 = q 22 = 1 such that p R 1 = p 1 and p R 2 = p 2 : For the cocktail regimen we let r 31 and r 32 be proportions of drugs 1 and 2 used in regimen 3 such that r 31 + r 32 = 1, 0 < r 31 < 1, and 0 < r 32 < 1: The price of regimen 3 will be determined by
We also allow r 31 to vary in order to study its impact. The pro…t-maximizing …rst order condition is identical to equation (2) with q 11 = q 22 = 1 and q 31 = r 31 : The marginal cost is assumed to be one-tenth of the stand-alone regimen's quality, i:e:; mc j = j =10 for j = 1; 2:
In our …rst numerical analysis we set r 31 to be 0:5 and 1 to be 1; and allow 2 to change from 1 to 3 so that the quality di¤erence between regimens changes from 0 to 2. A new equilibrium is computed for each value of 2 . This simple exercise allows us to understand how a …rm's behavior changes as the di¤erence in regimen quality increases. Figure 2 compares …rms' pro…t between cases with the cocktail regimen versus the benchmark case (no cocktails). The x-axis measures the quality di¤erence between …rm 2's stand-alone regimen and …rm 1's stand-alone regimen, i:e:; 2 1 , and the y-axis measures pro…t. Figure 2 demonstrates that the presence of the cocktail regimen increases pro…t for both …rms relative to not having a cocktail. Higher pro…t occurs as …rms decide to charge higher prices with the presence of a cocktail regimen. This is similar to a case where a …rm that produces multiple substitutes earns higher pro…t by charging higher prices. 20 An interesting di¤erence is that the cocktail regimen serves a multi-product function for both …rms at the same time.
Figure 2 also shows that as the quality di¤erence widens, pro…t increases faster for the lowversus the high-quality …rm relative to the benchmark case with no cocktail regimen. This occurs because the low-quality …rm "free-rides" on the relatively high quality provided by the cocktail regimen. In the benchmark case the low-quality …rm decreases its price while the high-quality …rm increases price as the quality di¤erence widens. With the cocktail present, however, as the quality di¤erence widens the low-quality …rm increases its price to the point where the market share of its stand-alone regimen becomes negligible. But the low-quality …rm still earns considerable pro…ts from the cocktail regimen. The high-quality …rm also increases its price, but not as substantially as the low-quality …rm, so that it sells both its stand-alone regimen and the cocktail regimen.
Consumers experience o¤setting e¤ects. They bene…t from having one more product available in the market but are hurt by the resulting higher prices. In our case the latter (negative) e¤ect is larger than the former (positive), so consumers are worse o¤ with the cocktail regimen, and further worse o¤ as the quality di¤erence increases. Compared to the benchmark case, consumer surplus is about 0.4 percent lower when 2 1 = 0 and about 8.0 percent lower when 2 1 = 2:
Whether consumer surplus falls, as it does in the above example, depends on how sensitive consumers are to price. If 2 1 = 0, consumers are better o¤ with the cocktail regimen when the price coe¢ cient is smaller (more negative) than -1.7. Prices with cocktails increase less and consumers are hurt less when consumers are more price sensitive. Even with a moderate quality di¤erence, however, consumers are hurt by the cocktail regimen for a wide range of values for the price coe¢ cient. When the price coe¢ cient is -2.5, the lowest value that sustains both …rms in the market in the benchmark case, consumers are worse o¤ with the cocktail regimen when 2 1 is larger than 0.2.
We next ask whether the two …rms can earn larger pro…ts with a cocktail regimen or by merging without participating in a cocktail regimen. The …rms have higher demand for their products with the cocktail regimen, but they do not lower their prices to attract consumers. In fact, the …rms charge higher prices with the cocktail regimen than in the merger case once the quality di¤erence becomes su¢ ciently large. Speci…cally, …rm 2 charges a higher price as soon as 2 1 exceeds 0.05, and …rm 1 charges a higher price when 2 1 exceeds 0.5. Despite higher prices, consumer surplus is 29 to 36 percent higher with the cocktail regimen and no merger versus a merger without the cocktail regimen, due to the bene…t of having another product available.
Interestingly, when we let the two …rms merge while allowing them to keep the cocktail regimen, the merger provides small incremental bene…ts. The merging …rm increases the prices only marginally, and the combined pro…t is less than one percent higher. This implies that …rms almost fully internalize externalities with the cocktail regimen. As we elaborate in Section7.2, the small incremental bene…ts of merging occurs in part because the acquisition of a complementary product creates an incentive for the newly-merged …rm to reduce prices. Thus, …rms may not have a strong incentive to merge once they participate in a cocktail regimen, particularly if there are transactions costs associated with merging. Consumers are clearly worse o¤ with the merger because the cocktail is available without the merger.
In the next numerical analysis we allow one of the two …rms to set two separate prices: one for the stand-alone regimen and another for their drug in the cocktail regimen. This situation is equivalent to a case where a …rm has two separate drugs, one used in a stand-alone regimen and the other used in a cocktail regimen. We …rst let …rm 1, the low-quality …rm, to set two separate prices while varying 2 from 1 to 3. Figure 4 compares the two prices that …rm 1 now sets versus its single price from the …rst numerical analysis (Price1_Single). This …gure demonstrates that the …rm sets a much lower price for the stand-alone regimen (Price1_Solo) than for the cocktail regimen (Price1_Cocktail). Over the entire range of the quality di¤erence, the former price is about a 50 percent lower than the latter.
Compared to the baseline single price (Price1_Single) case, the …rm sets about a 14 percent lower price for the stand-alone regimen and a 66 percent higher price for the cocktail regimen when We next let …rm 2, the high quality …rm, set two separate prices. Firm 2 also sets a much lower price for the stand-alone regime than for the cocktail regimen. However, both prices increase as the quality di¤erence widens. This price increase seems to reduce the ability of …rm 1 to freeriding on the cocktail regimen's high quality. As in the previous case, …rm 2 is better o¤ with the more ‡exible pricing while …rm 1 is worse o¤.
Finally, we …x 1 = 1 and 2 = 1; and let r 31 change from 0.5 to 0.9. This exercise helps us understand how the incentives to participate in making the cocktail regimen change when for chemical and/or biological reasons, one …rm's drug constitutes a higher percentage of the cocktail recipe. We …nd, not surprisingly, that the pro…t for …rm 1 increases as its mixture ratio increases, and the reverse is true for …rm 2 as its mixture ratio decreases. Compared to the benchmark case, …rm 1's pro…t is always higher and …rm 2's pro…t is higher up to r 31 = 0:8 and then becomes lower beyond that point. We repeat this exercise by varying r 32 from 0.5 to 0.9 while …xing 1 and 2
and obtain qualitatively same results.
Demand Estimation
We estimate equation (4) using regimen-level market share, price, and attribute data. The price variable is likely to be correlated with the unobserved attributes or contemporaneous demand shock because …rms observe them before setting prices. This price endogeneity problem requires using instruments to consistently estimate the demand equation. We construct two instruments with the lagged prices of other regimens. In particular, for the price of regimen j in period t, one instrument is the average price in period t 1 of all regimens other than regimen j, and the other is the average price in period t 1 of regimens produced by …rms whose drugs are not used in regimen j.
Our identifying assumptions are that these instruments are uncorrelated with the currentperiod demand shock, but are correlated with the current period price of regimen j. The latter correlation should occur due to oligopolistic interactions and the evidence that the price of a given product is usually autocorrelated. The former assumption requires that a demand shock for regimen j in period t is uncorrelated with a demand shock for regimen k in period t 1, and is likely to hold true. However, this condition could be violated if there exists a time-persistent market-level demand shock. 21 We use the generalized method of moments with (Z 0 Z) 1 as the weighting matrix, where Z includes the instrumental variables, all the observed regimen attributes other than price and the time dummy variables. 22 The estimates are presented in Table 2 . The …rst column reports the results of the OLS logit model; the second column, labeled IV Logit, reports results using lagged prices as instruments; and the third column, labeled Nested Logit I, reports results of the nested logit with two regimen groups. The last column, labeled Nested Logit II, corresponds to the nested logit where regimens for patients who can tolerate intensive therapy are again divided into two groups (three regimen groups in total). In the two nested logit models we treat the within-group share variable as an endogenous variable. In all speci…cations we use the logarithm of price as a regressor.
Comparing the price coe¢ cient from the …rst column with the other three reveals that there is a positive correlation between price and the demand shock, and the instrumental variables 2 1 We do not use other products'attributes as instruments because they do not vary much over time due to infrequent product entry and exit. The …rst stage F-statistics on joint signi…cance of these instruments is less than …ve, and the estimation results are not substantially di¤erent from the OLS logit results that we present. 2 2 Our sample size is not large enough to use the optimal weighting matrix.
mitigate this problem. The price coe¢ cient changes from -0.690 without instruments (OLS Logit)
to -2.150 in IV Logit, and to -1.557 and -1.794 in two nested logit models. The price coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the one-percent level in all models. The F-statistic from the …rst stage F-test for the joint signi…cance of the instruments is over 10 in all three speci…cations using instruments for price. In the nested logit models, the coe¢ cient for the within-group share variable is 0.403 and 0.421 for Nested Logit I and Nested Logit II respectively, and statistically signi…cant.
This indicates that regimens are closer substitutes within a group than between groups. 23 Allowing for more nestings in Nested Logit II does not a¤ect the results substantially.
The e¢ cacy attribute coe¢ cients are statistically signi…cant in IV Logit and the nested logit models, but only the response rate coe¢ cient is positive. Because these three variables are correlated with one another, we evaluate preferences for a linear combination of the three e¢ cacy variables. In the IV Logit model, the average willingness to pay for obtaining the mean e¢ cacy from a 12-week treatment is about $70,000 in 2005. The average cost for that treatment in the same year is about $18,000. The average willingness to pay for the mean e¢ cacy is slightly smaller (by less than $3,000) in the nested logit models.
Among the side e¤ect variables, only the neutropenia coe¢ cient is both statistically signi…cant and negative as expected. The estimate implies that the average willingness to pay to reduce a chance of having neutropenia by one percent is about $900. The other side e¤ect variables are either positive or insigni…cant. This may occur because cancer patients often take drugs that ameliorate the impact of certain side e¤ects, such as pain, nausea, and diarrhea, while neutropenia is fatal and harder to prevent with other drugs. If a physician prescribes anti-pain and antiemetic drugs in conjunction with the chemotherapys drugs, she may downgrade the importance of these side e¤ects when choosing a regimen. Another possible explanation is that the toxic drugs are more likely to cause side e¤ects but have other favorable unmeasured attributes. Thus, it is important to include these variables because, if left in the unobserved attribute term, they are likely to be correlated with the e¢ cacy variables. 24 
Counterfactual Exercises
With demand estimates we can recover the marginal cost of each drug using equation (1), and given the marginal cost and demand estimates we can compute hypothetical equilibrium prices under various counterfactual scenarios. We focus on the last six quarters of the sample period,
i.e., from the second quarter of 2004 to the third quarter of 2005. That is a period in which all 12 major regimens are present in the market. All results are averaged over these six quarters. 25 In this Section we present results using the estimates reported in the second column of Table 2 (IV Logit). Results using the estimates in the third column (Nested Logit I ) are also presented in Tables A-2 A-4.
Welfare E¤ects
In the …rst counterfactual exercise we remove one cocktail regimen from the market at a time, calculate the new Nash equilibrium prices for all branded drugs, estimate pro…ts for all major …rms, and compute consumer surplus. This exercise is similar to the welfare counterfactual in Petrin (2002) . Because there are six cocktail regimens, we evaluate six hypothetical cases. The results are reported in Table 3 . The baseline reported in the …rst row, the situation actually observed in the market, is normalized to 100. Therefore, the table allows one to observe percentage changes in prices, pro…ts, and consumer surplus when one particular cocktail regimen is removed compared to the observed situation. The numbers in bold typeface are level changes for …rms that participate in the removed regimen (which we refer to as "participating …rms" hereafter.) The rows are ordered from the oldest to the most recent cocktail that entered the market, and the columns are ordered from the earliest …rm that sold a cocktail at the left to the most recent at the right. There are a few notable features of the …rst panel. In …ve out of six cases, prices of the participating …rms' drugs are predicted to fall when a regimen is removed, which indicates that introducing a cocktail regimen is likely to increase participating …rms' prices. Because price is a strategic complement, prices of drugs not used in the removed regimen generally fall as well. Roche is an exception; it consistently increases its price when other …rms'cocktail regimens are removed.
In all …ve of these cases, the price of the incumbent …rm's drug in the cocktail (i.e., the …rst …rm in bold typeface in a row) is predicted to fall by more than the price of the entering …rm. This indicates that when a new cocktail regimen is introduced, the incumbent may be increasing price primarily to protect the market share of its stand-alone regimen.
The exceptions in the …rst panel, such as the predicted price increases in the second row and Roche's pricing reactions to other …rms' cocktail regimen introductions, could result if the structure of cross-…rm bundling is more complicated than we are able to model. When a cocktail regimen is removed in the numerical analysis, each …rm was allowed a single stand-alone regimen.
In the actual market, on the other hand, all drugs other than ImClone's are used in three cocktail regimens. When one cocktail regimen is removed, therefore, participating …rms will still consider their other cocktail regimens when setting prices. 26 The second panel of Table 3 reports estimated pro…t once a particular regimen is removed.
No participating …rm is better o¤ without a regimen. Pro…t losses are sometimes substantial, especially when the cocktail's market share is much larger than that of a …rm's stand-alone regimen.
ImClone's pro…t (second to last row), for example, is predicted to fall by over 80 percent if its regimen, which has a market share three times larger than the market share of its stand-alone regimen, is removed. Non-participating …rms are generally worse o¤ too, although there are some exceptions, such as Roche in the Sano…-Genentech case and ImClone in the P…zer-Genentech case.
We report consumer surplus in the …nal column of Table 3 . The e¤ect of removing a regimen on consumer surplus is not clear a priori. Consumers are worse o¤ with one fewer available product; but consumers bene…t from the resulting lower prices. The demand model with an additive logit error term allows variety to provide the maximum possible bene…t. Table 3 demonstrates that on net we predict that in …ve of the six cases consumers would be better o¤ without the cocktail regimens. All drug prices are predicted to increase when the P…zer-Roche cocktail is removed, so consumers clearly bene…t with this cocktail. In general, consumer gains from the price decreases tend to outweigh the losses from reduced variety.
The evidence on prices, pro…ts and consumer welfare in Table 3 indicates that these particular cross-…rm bundlings create a less competitive market that harms consumers. Firms setting prices in the presence of cocktail regimens consider the demand for the cocktail regimen as well as the demand for their stand-alone regimens. In doing so, …rms internalize part of the externalities they impose on their competitors, which results in a less competitive outcome. This result leads to our next question: if a cocktail regimen renders a market less competitive, how does a cocktail scenario compare to a merger or perfect collusion? We answer this question in the next counterfactual exercise. Table 4 reports the joint pro…t of the merging …rms and consumer surplus when di¤erent pairs of …rms merge, where the two …rms'joint pro…t under the current situation (of o¤ering the cocktail regimen) is normalized to 100. For comparison, the joint pro…t from the …rst counterfactual exercise is reported in the second column, which is labeled Removed. The pro…t loss can be as large as 49 percent when the Sano…-Genentech regimen is removed.
Merger Analysis
In the column labeled Removed+Merger we report the joint pro…t when the two …rms merge without the cocktail regimen. Although the joint pro…t in third column exceeds that of the second because the two …rms have more market power, this pro…t is not necessarily larger than the current pro…t with the cocktail regimen. In fact, in three of …ve cases the joint pro…t of the merger is smaller than the joint pro…t with the cocktail regimen; …rms gain more from cocktail regimens than from mergers. 27 The di¤erence is quite substantial; mergers are estimated to increase joint pro…t by less than 15 percent in these three cases whereas cocktail regimens increase pro…t by at least 30 percent.
In the column labeled Merger in Table 4 we report the joint pro…t when two …rms merge while maintaining their cocktail regimen. Interestingly, this joint pro…t is not much higher than the current joint pro…t. The largest increase (10.2 percent) occurs when P…zer and Roche merge.
Compared to the pro…t change from adding the cocktail regimen (column 1 -column 2), a merger increases the joint pro…t only marginally, con…rming our …nding in Section 5.
In our counterfactual exercise the merging …rm does not always increase prices. In the P…zer-Roche and the Roche-Sano… mergers, the merging …rm raises both drugs' prices as in the numerical simulation. In the P…zer-Genentech merger, on the other hand, the merged …rm reduces Genentech's drug price while raising P…zer's drug price. More interestingly, in the last two merger cases the merging …rm reduces both drugs'prices.
This mixed pricing result seems to be driven by a tension between complementary e¤ects and market power e¤ects. Without complementarity a merging …rm always increases prices, but
because it now has a complement, the merging …rm has an incentive to reduce prices. 28 Thus, the merging …rm would not increase prices as much as it would without a complement and may decrease prices if the complementary e¤ects dominate.
The mixed pricing result also indicates that the merging …rm's joint pro…t is not always higher than the current joint pro…t. 29 If the merging …rm reduces prices because of dominant complementary e¤ects, the other …rms'prices, which are strategic complements, may go down as well, which can hurt all …rms including the merging …rm. Although this does not occur in the last two merger cases in Table 4 , in Table A -3 we show that a merger can lead to reduced pro…t when
P…zer and ImClone merge with their cocktail regimen and we model demand with a nested logit.
In the scenario reported in Table A -3, the merging …rm's joint pro…t is about two percent lower than the current joint pro…t. 30 As expected, consumer surplus decreases when …rms merge without the cocktail (going from Removed to Removed+Merger ) and increases when …rms add the cocktail regimen while being merged (going from Removed+Merger to Merger ), as displayed toward the right of Table 4 .
In the former case consumer surplus falls as the market becomes less competitive; in the latter case consumer surplus rises as another product is added to the choice set. However, consumer surplus can change in either direction when two …rms o¤ering a cocktail regimen are allowed to merge 2 8 This is basically the same as a double marginalization problem with a complement. 2 9 A merger is not always pro…t enhancing in an oligopolistic setting. It is well known that in a symmetric three-…rm Cournot environment, a merger between any two …rms is not pro…t enhancing. This is because the third …rm responds to a merger by increasing its quantity.
3 0 Consider a simple case with linear demand where two price-setting …rms independently sell perfect complements. A merger between the two is not necessarily pro…table if there is a third …rm selling a bundle of di¤erentiated complements.
(going from Current to Merger ). Since the number of regimens does not change, it depends solely on how the …rms change prices after a merger.
Setting Two Prices
In our third counterfactual exercise we allow one of the participating …rms in a cocktail to set two separate prices for the same drug: one for its stand-alone regimen and one for its drug in the cocktail. This is the same exercise as the two-price setting case in Section 5. As mentioned, we use this exercise as a validation test for our static Nash pricing assumption. Moreover, this exercise sheds light on the welfare e¤ects of Abbott's pricing strategy in the HIV/AIDS market. Table 5 reports price, pro…t, and consumer surplus when …rms have pricing ‡exibility, where the baseline levels are indexed to 100. The column labeled Solo reports the optimal drug prices for the stand-alone regimen and the numbers in bold typeface are prices for the drug used in the cocktail regimen. In the second row, for example, we predict that P…zer would reduce the price of irinotecan by almost 60 percent for its stand-alone regimen while increasing the price of irinotecan by 25 percent for use in its three cocktail regimens. Table 5 shows that the drug price for cocktail regimens can go up dramatically with additional price ‡exibility. Roche increases its drug price for cocktail regimens by a factor of …ve (in the fourth row) and Sano… does so by almost two times (in the …fth row). Drug prices for the stand-alone regimens usually decrease substantially, ranging from 23.5 to 57.2 percent. A …rm tries to attract consumers to its stand-alone regimen by charging a higher price for a drug used in cocktails. The market share of the cocktail regimen in question a¤ects the magnitude of the price change. For example, ImClone changes prices moderately (the last row) because its cocktail regime has a much larger market share than its stand-alone regime. The other …rms'reaction to the new price scheme is mixed. As one price rises and another decreases, some …rms respond more strongly to the rising price and others to the decreasing price.
The second panel of the table demonstrates that …rms earn higher pro…ts by setting two prices in almost all cases, which is consistent with the numerical example. An exception is Sano…, whose pro…t falls by …ve percent. This seems to be driven by a large price decrease by P…zer and Roche (24.4 and 29.7 percent, respectively), which harms all …rms. 31 The ‡exible pricing hurts the other …rms, although the magnitude is usually relatively small. However, Table A A di¤erence is that in this case all other …rms raise their prices.
We report consumer surplus in the last panel of Table 5 . Since the regimen qualities do not change in this counterfactual, the only variable a¤ecting consumer surplus is price. Consumers pay a lower price for some regimens and a higher price for others. Thus, the net e¤ect is determined by the magnitude of price changes and regimens market shares. Consumer surplus is higher in all cases, but Table A-4 shows an exception where consumer surplus is lower when Roche sets two prices and we model demand with a nested logit. This is also a case where all …rms increase prices.
These results demonstrate that it is hard to predict the welfare e¤ects of the ‡exible pricing scheme. Firm pro…ts and consumer surplus may change in either direction depending on how …rms react to the ‡exible pricing. This suggests that Abbott's pricing strategy with Norvir and Kaletra is not necessarily detrimental to welfare. Nevertheless, the result that a …rm lowers a price for a stand-alone regimen and raises a price for a drug used in cocktails is true in all models and speci…cations we investigate.
Conclusions
This paper is the …rst attempt to understand …rms'decisions when their products are consumed in conjunction with their competitors'products. The …rm controls only the price of its own product, and therefore needs to take into account the e¤ect of its pricing strategy on all the bundles in which its product appears.
We apply our framework to the pharmaceutical industry, in particular to colorectal cancer chemotherapy drugs. We estimate regimen-level demand using unique data from IntrinsiQ, and perform a series of counterfactual exercises using estimates of the demand parameters and marginal cost. First, we …nd that inter-…rm combinations are likely to enhance pro…t for all …rms participating in a product combination because the e¤ect of internalizing pricing externalities dominates the business-stealing e¤ect. However, consumers are likely to be worse o¤ with the combined products, despite more variety, because they pay higher prices. In settings where consumers are less price elastic, bundling may increase consumer welfare.
We also …nd that …rms earn higher pro…ts with product combinations than mergers. Even if …rms that already have product combinations merge, the merger increases pro…ts only marginally.
Interestingly, consumers are not necessarily worse o¤ because the merged …rm may lower prices to fully internalize the pricing externalities. These results suggest that the anti-competitive merger e¤ects would be smaller when the products of merging …rms are already consumed together in the market, and should help the government evaluate the expected outcomes of the recent merger wave in the pharmaceutical market.
In addition, we …nd that if a …rm is able to set two di¤erent prices, one for its standalone regimen and another for its component in a cocktail regimen -rather than a single price for both products, it would set a much higher price for the cocktail component than the stand-alone product. This result is consistent with what we observe in other sectors of the pharmaceutical industry, such as Abbott's pricing strategy with Norvir and Kaletra, and supports our static Nash pricing assumption. 
